Aleksander Alafuzoff

Tikkurilan lukio, Vantaa, Finland

I.

One could assert that certainty has always been the holy grail of philosophy. While anyone can assert anything he pleases, there is something inherently satisfying in explicating an absolute truth, one that cannot be subjected to doubt. In fact, it could be argued that philosophy, as the love of knowledge, seeks this kind of certainty: after all knowledge does imply a sort of timelessness and objective truth. However, in seeking out the certainty of knowledge, philosophy often leads to questioning of that, which was originally thought of as knowledge. In this sense, philosophy can also be seen as a "negative" discipline; a discipline, which culls the fields of assumed knowledge. The quote from Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy (1912) addresses this duality by admitting the "negative" aspects of philosophy, while proclaiming its value in broadening scope of thought.

Arguing for philosophy as a "negative" discipline is a mistake, if Russell's quote is considered properly. Russell states that philosophy diminishes "our feeling of certainty", which is probably taken for a criticism of philosophy as a "negative science". However, to call philosophy a "negative" discipline has implications beyond what Russell states: a "negative science" is one that does not provide anything it only limits the breadth of knowledge. Although somewhat hidden in the quote, it is clear that Russell does not mean to call into question the nature of philosophy. To explicate this better, one must notice the use of the word "feeling". In a context discussing certainty, the use of the word "feeling" is oddly misplaced. A feeling does not and cannot convey the certainty that philosophy requires. An arachnophobe may feel frightened, threatened even in the presence of a spider, yet this conveys no knowledge of the spider's intentions or nature. From a philosophical perspective the term "feeling of certainty" is a complete misnomer; from a Wittgensteinian point of view the combinational use of these words in a philosophical context is an error. Considering the context once again, Russell's statement seems to be at least partly ironic.

If Russell is not arguing for a "negative" view of philosophy, some other quality must imply this thought. This quality could be defined as the fear of doubt. Certainty, even a false one, is probably a much more pleasant feeling than uncertainty. In some ways this idea is implied in the classical texts themselves: the debates between the stoics and Socrates in some of Plato's works imply a dread balance between assumed certainty and doubt. For example, in one of the discussions Aristotle shows the problematic nature of the issue that is now referred to as the "divine command theory". Socrates’ (or in this context, more properly, Plato's) method of doubt and questioning revealed the underlying and unargued assertions of the stoics and many other characters. From history or rather Aristotle's ultimate fate, it seems that the people whose assertions were analysed in this fashion were not happy with the dissolution of their "knowledge". Most probably a similar mentality is dominant today as well.

Philosophy cannot be taken as a objectively "negative" discipline. While philosophy certainly does show or at least aims to show "false knowledge" from actual knowledge, this does not affect true knowledge in any way. If knowledge truly exist objectively, irrespective of anyone or -thing, no amount of philosophical analysis can disrupt it. Furthermore, it is rather naïve to feel resentment for loss of assumptions: they had no true value to begin with. Thus, while philosophy can be felt to be a "negative" discipline, this feeling is for nothing more than a foolish illusion; a reminiscence for misunderstanding.

Regardless of philosophy's status as a non-"negative" discipline, there still remains a need for philosophy as a positive discipline: one that provides new knowledge. Knowledge or "true justified belief" requires certainty. While the concept of truth itself implies permanence and hence certainty, the real issue here is the word "justified". If one cannot justify a "true belief", it cannot be held to be knowledge. Furthermore, to justify a belief one must become relatively convinced of the certainty of the belief. If one cannot be certain of the truth of a belief, it cannot be justified. Hence, certainty is an integral part of knowledge. Naturally one might prompt for a different definition of knowledge. However, even then it is very difficult or perhaps even impossible to imagine uncertain knowledge.

One of the classical example of a truth provided by philosophy is Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). Quite ironically this discovery was made by Descartes, who was a proponent of the method of doubt that arguably restricts the domain of knowledge. The method as used by Descartes, while providing quite interesting insights into the nature of thought, showed that many thoughts could be traced back to deception, yet one truth remained: there were thoughts. From this Descartes inferred that something, the proverbial "I" must exist. In fact, Descartes' inference has been thoroughly criticised by reapplication of the method of doubt; Descartes observed only one certainty "there are thoughts". While Descartes' argument does shed a curious light on something most people consider "intimately familiar", the issue at hand here is arguably that of the method of arriving at the (modified) piece of "certain" knowledge. Thus, it seems that there is something special with the method of doubt: while it reduces the scope of knowledge to its limit, it also increases the amount of certainty until an absolute is reached. Naturally the certainty of Descartes' (and his contemporaries') statement can hypothetically be questioned, the point of the matter is that humans cannot categorically question this statement. Thus, while hypothetically it can be questioned whether or not Descartes' conclusion is certain, this questioning can play no part in rational discourse, such as that found in philosophy.

In addition to the method of doubt, there is at least one other process, which can at least superficially provide knowledge: the method of contradiction. The method of contradiction is the basis of analytic statements, which categorically cannot be doubted. To question the certainty of a statement like "all unmarried males are unmarried" (1) is entirely non-sensical, even to a greater extent than questioning Descartes' conclusion. One should here that the example provided is far more than a simple analytic statement like "All bachelors are unmarried" (2). (1) is a logical truth, which remains absolutely true regardless of the words substituted for unmarried and male. (2), on the other hand, is seemingly synonymous with (1), a matter that has been questioned. Although ever so slightly beside the point, the analyticity and therefore certainty of most analytic statements has been questioned. Willard Van Orman Quine argues in his essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism that statements similar to (2) cannot be reduced to logical truths of the likes of (1). Thus, it has not been objectively established whether or not more ambiguous analytic statements (eg. (2)) are actually analytic and certain.

The method of contradiction is unaffected by Quine's attack, as it functions on an entirely different level. The method of contradiction deals with the logical impossibility of the contradiction of statements like (1). While statements like (2) can be examined by application of the method of contradiction, its primary focus is set on showing the certainty of logical statements of the likes of (1). However, in providing certainty, like the method of doubt, the method of contradiction restricts the domain of statements to an absolute. Logically true statements like (1) cannot, unfortunately, provide new information. Yet there are certain cases where fundamentally similar statements can be very useful: mathematics.

Contemporary analyses of the nature of mathematics are a prime example of philosophy revealing and dealing with familiar things from an unfamiliar point of view. One modern interpretation of mathematics provided by the philosopher Ayer, argues that mathematics and mathematical methods are nothing more than incredibly complicated tautologies. The methods of mathematics are nothing more than processes whereby one may satisfy himself of the validity of a complicated tautology. Ayer's point of view is a very interesting, albeit an unclassical one. Yet it portrays the nature of philosophical inquiry in a very clear way: philosophical inquiry may "show familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect".

In conclusion, the nature of philosophy, as a non-"negative" discipline, has been expounded to a degree. Furthermore, some evidence has been shown for positive aspects of philosophy. Therefore, one may easily accept Bertrand Russell's statements of the nature of philosophy as a valid point of view. Philosophy is a stimulating and intellectually satisfying endeavour, one that should be protected and supported.