25. marraskuuta 2009

1.     Do you think that morality should be based on rationality?

Morality is, unfortunately, a rather fluid concept, varying from individual to individual. However, at its core is the implication of a set of rules which allows for the differentiation between right and wrong. In this sense, the term morality is often taken to mean normative ethics, the branch of ethics which is concerned with establishing norms or guidelines for how one should act. Colloquially, morality refers to daily practice in accordance with commonly held values.

Ethical norms are commonly established within groups in the context of religion, nationality or other societal factors.  However, the wide variation found in moral practices suggests that there are no real universal norms or values, although the term ‘morality’ seems to imply a kind of singular, universal, “right” code of conduct, usually those of the user of the term himself. For example, in the case of a pastor preaching about the “erosion of morality”, indignation is only roused in those who are sympathetic to the speaker’s views, even though a blanket term is being employed. Also, the nature of the word carries some connotations of a stern religious code of requirements; this connection exists in the sense that moral guidelines are sometimes justified by appealing to the wishes or demands of supernatural entities, but morality and religion are not dependent upon each other.

Although different ethical codes are justified by appeals to reason, emotion or intuition, they all share a common requirement: all must follow a logical progression. The concept of reason as a guide for morality is a fairly old concept: Plato expressed his view of reason in his Chariot Analogy, in which spirit and impulse are two horses controlled by the charioteer, reason. If the charioteer maintains control of the steeds, the chariot can ascend to the heavens. Rationality has since formed the basis for normative theories by Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, among others. Kant developed a system of ethics based on rationality, arguing that the variation in individual emotional reactions renders feelings irrelevant in trying to determine the moral worth of an action. In Kant’s ethical doctrine, duties constitute morality. These duties are arrived at through rational determination, which, being a matter of logical progression, would result in the same duties for every rational moral agent. A moral action is therefore one which can be applied as an obligation for all mankind without contradiction. The source of moral worth in this case is derived from the principle which motivates one to act, which are usually in the form of duties. In Kant’s view, a moral act is valuable in itself and not because of its consequences.

The idea that rationality can provide a foundation for morality implies that we, as rational beings, are able to discover moral truths by solely relying on our powers of reason. This is true in the sense that we can assess the moral worth of actions without actually engaging in them. John Stuart Mill’s consequentialist theories of ethics also rely upon powers of reason. A rational being can judge the rightness or wrongness of an action. In the case of Mill’s utilitarianism, the morality of an act can be judged by its tendency to produce happiness and minimize pain. This lends itself to many practical applications, since it is often relatively simple to weigh the probable benefits in terms of propagated happiness. Moreover, Mill held that higher, rational pleasures are preferable to lower, less complex pleasures. Rationality thus forms not only the means to morality, but the end as well.

Mill’s theory does not, however, provide rates of comparison between higher and lower pleasures and how to combine these with the greater good.

However, rationality does not provide us with the knowledge needed to draw conclusions in all cases. Usually, we need to draw on past experiences and perceptions of the world to attach meaning to concepts. Therefore, the base of morality could not technically be rationality, since the source lies somewhere else. David Hume criticized the view that morality should be based on rationality and argued that reason is relegated to second place to feelings or passions in matters of morality, since reason cannot determine the ends of morality, which are given meaning by feelings and emotions. This is contrary to the idea put forward by Plato that we require reason to discover what our goals should be, and then using practical reason to achieve those goals. Modern psychology gives some support to Hume’s claim: emotions have been demonstrated to exert a great effect upon decision-making, which extends to moral decisions as well. For Hume, a fact of human psychology is that we start with our feelings and can then progress with reason to satisfy them.

It is unclear whether an entity with only the faculty of reason (i.e. no emotion or sense perception, etc.) could make moral judgements. This is contingent upon one’s view of the realism – antirealism debate: a moral realist would argue that such a being could be capable of moral judgement, since reason would allow for the discovery of moral facts or laws, while a moral antirealist would state that this would not be possible since morality is invented or decided upon by humans. However, such a being would not necessarily be motivated to act morally, particularly in light of the is-ought problem, which illustrates the impasse between descriptive and descriptive statements.