Kalle Koivuniemi

25. marraskuuta 2009

Etusivu Kalenteri Tapahtumat Filosofia ET FETOsta UKK

Etusivu
Kalle Koivuniemi
Karoliina Pulkkinen
Chitra Adkar
Tapani Pulkkinen
Erik Ramberg
Lasse Heikkilä
Jyrki Eerola
Sveinung Knutsen
Prathamesh Kubal
Matias Kuokkanen
Henning Rognlien
Joel Linnainmäki
Emilia Kaihua
Vilma Vartiainen
Essi Mäkelä
Henna Vanninen
Lassi Perämäki
Joona Malmi
Tiina Lybec
Touko Kuusi
Kysymykset
Ohjeet

 

Kalle Koivuniemi - Tikkurilan lukio

2.

Quote number two is a an argument for determinism versus free will. It states that all our actions are the summation of causal relationships over which we ultimately have litttle to no control over. Our thoughts, memories and desires, all factors that form our decisions, are not ours to decide. Furthermore, the decisions, though occasionally different even if the same choice is presented, is wholly dependent on circumstances surrounding us to such a degree, that our decisions are inevitable through all the predetermined conditions around us. We do not make free decisions, but are psychologically ’programmed’ to respond in a certain way through our expereinces and through forms of social conditioning.

In order to fully analyze the conditions for a free choice, we need to determine the conditions  under which a free decision can be made, before we even start to determine whether we can choose or not at all. In order to make a free choice, a person must be capable of commitiing at least two different  alternative actions, e.g. choosing to drink tea or not. From an objective outsider’s perspective, these conditions are easily met under normal conidtions. The only way such conditions could be considered an unfree action, is if the tea drinker is being forced to do so. However, what exactly constitutes force or coercion?

An easy example of coercion is of course through physical violence. However, can this truly be called coercion either? For Jean-Paul Sartre, we are always free, and even in cases where we appear to be without choice, this is merely a case of bad faith, in deceiving oneself into believing they are without choice. For example, and the example is a rather extreme one, a slave is only a slave because they choose to submit themself to the master. Even under coercion, by even threat of death, choice has not ultimately be denied from the slave. A decision can still be made: servitude or death. Although Sartre said that we are ’condemned to be free’, he admits that we are still subject to facticity, i.e. circumstances around us like time, physcial distance, language etc. limiting our choices in a practical sense. But ultimately even in the slave exmple, free will is not truly removed, even if a majority of options are removed.

Sartre’s argument of course relies on the potential self-reflective nature of people, that by being aware of the facticity of our existences and analysing the conditions under which we live, we can essentially remove bad faith and be free to make our choices. The quoted argument however does provide room for a counter-argument. Even acts of self-reflection can be considered being the result of predetermined causes in our living conditions. After all, a desire for self-reflection must stem from a causal link of somekind, shouldn’t it? A causal link between a desire to self-reflect could come from reading a philosophy book, which could have come from from a desire to simply complete school work and so on to an arguable first cause or simple inifnite chain of causality if the logic of causality is trached to its ’end’ point. The argument holds, as the potential for self-reflection in people is dependent on conditions around them. For example, living in a poor country leaves one with very little chances for education which would give the person the tools for critical self-reflection, thus denying them the chance for self-refection that could remove the affect of crircumstantial conditions.

The quoted argument is strong, as it takes one of the principles seen to govern the universe, that of causality, and applies it in a holistic way to include all possible factors that determine a choice. For example, a decision to drink tea would most likely come about through a desire to drink it, which stems from biological factors. Even if countered, that the tea drinker could be thirsty and still decide to not drink it, this decision was not made by free will, but forced through a desire, like a sense of self control rising from whatever earlier cause. It seems that even if conditions for multiple choices is present, the final decision still isn’t free.

Of course, the argument hasn’t fully disproved Sartre’s claims either. Even if the desire for self-reflection might be contingent on conditions beyond our control, does this mean that the actual act of self-reflection is incapable of allowing freedom from the apparent hold of facticity? If one is fully aware of the factors surrounding them, of how their desires came to be and how their memories are potentially going to affect their decisions, could it not be argued that awareness will alow a chance outside of the factors control? Although this line of thought seems promising, it too runs into problems orginating from the conditional determinance argument presented in the quote. If a choice is made counter to what one belives they would be forced to do, simply for the sake of avoiding a predetermined act, this choice is still determined by the conditions before it. The act to ’rebel’ is dependent on an oppressional force. If that oppressing force is missing, a counterdecision would not have been made. So the conditional determinance argument still holds as well. But the self-reflection argument has gained a foothold, as now there is a more possible chance of free decisions. The rebellious acts could only be considered determined, if the self-reflective person always chose to act counter to his expectations; they are however capable of possibly choosing otherwise even under the same conditions, although naturally some condistions must have changed through the passage of time and acquirement of new experiences. But this argument doesn’t counter the fact, that even as self-reflective beings, we will still have previosuly determined desires, affecting our decision making.

It seems that no conclusive answer can be given at this level, as both sides have not fully been refuted. The problem might arise from how neither argument can properly be attacked. A determinist can always counter that everything is resultant of previous actions, but this can neither truly be proven or disproved. His argument seems strong, because it is applying causality to its full  effect, a principle widely held to govern the physcial universe, and as we are most likely entities tied to a physical world. However, is causality as firm as it is seen? If I recall correctly, it was David Hume who pointed out some causality releated issues. But regardless of who it was who pointed out the problem, the connection between, what will for the sake of simplicity be referred to as ’cause’ and ’effect’, is not as clear as many people think. It seems that causal rules are largely based on inductive reasoning. That ’cause ’ only seems to be connected to ’effect’. For instance, this connection is largely dependent on conditions as well. Absolute proof that windows always break if a rock is thrown at them only works in our limited frame of existence, time and space-wise. We cannot hold it absolutely sure that a causal link will hold throughout time and in all areas of space. Even under the same frame of reference, it cannot absolutely be said that one act causes another, but more as it will probably follow.

The problem of course with this is that the possible breaks in causal link might be dependent on other causes that end up changing the results. This means that just because something is usually expected to happen, like windows breaking if something is thrown at them, and this fails to happen, does not necessarily mean a break in causality, but that a new factor has been intrduced, e.g. the window is bulletproof glass. So although there is a sort of epistemological problem with causality, it does not really refute it as such. In fact, empiricism seem for the most part confrim causality in the realms of science in repeated tests.

Returning to the issue of free will vs determinism, after the examination of causality, it would seem that determinism still holds strong. All assets that go into making decisions, like motives of any kind, are always contingent on surrounding conditions, no matter what amount of self-refelction is done. In fact, if reflection is done, for example a logical analysis of the situation you are in, it is practically inevitable that you will make the decision you believe will benefit you most, unless there is some sort of reason for faulty judgement making present, like a mental disorder for example. It would seem that the claim that we are products of facticity cannot be disproved. But for this reason, the argument is slightly fallacious as well. For the very same reasons we cannot disprove the argument, it cannot ultimately be proved either. The line where self-refelction wins over the conditions surrounds it is blurry. Although acts can be done counter to our desires, they can just as well be done in accordance, even fully arbitrarily.

It is my personal view that we are as humans greatly under the hold of the circumstances around us, but through careful examination of those circumstances, we can free ourselves of potential ’programming’. For example, a raicst person might be so because of his upbrining and social conditions and thus respond violently against minorities, but if he is given the tools to examine why he acts this way, he might no longer hold his previous views. True, this possibility for self-relfection often stems from a cause, but we cannot be certain how the actual process of reflection affects causal links. It is more like Sartre’s bad faith that we allow ourselves to delusionally surrender our free will to the world and people in it. A choice is always possible, even while under coercion. Why we choose something is probaly highly dependent on our desires and emotions which are not necessarily under our control, but we can control how we respond to needs, like in the form of hedonist glutton and an ascetic hedonist, both trying to reach fulfilment, but through different means, one though a more controlled way to maximize pleasure from rare events and another through a carefree one of full enjoyment risking possible overstimulation. I cannot however refute the argument that our choices are inevitably based on conditions around us, and I believe that most of our decisions are don int this light, but choices can still be made. Through self-reflection, we can decide to act on our desires or not. There is no way to prove that the end result is free or not.

 

Etusivu | Kalle Koivuniemi | Karoliina Pulkkinen | Chitra Adkar | Tapani Pulkkinen | Erik Ramberg | Lasse Heikkilä | Jyrki Eerola | Sveinung Knutsen | Prathamesh Kubal | Matias Kuokkanen | Henning Rognlien | Joel Linnainmäki | Emilia Kaihua | Vilma Vartiainen | Essi Mäkelä | Henna Vanninen | Lassi Perämäki | Joona Malmi | Tiina Lybec | Touko Kuusi | Kysymykset | Ohjeet

Tätä sivustoa on viimeksi päivitetty 25. marraskuuta 2009