25. lokakuuta 2010

Helena Sorva

1. "So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition.

We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are

to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is

bad?" (Plato, Republic)

The principle of justice could be defined as protection of values accepted and agreed upon by a certain sphere – a community, a state, humankind. Usually questions of justice arise when the way of life, moral principles or possibilities of a person or of a group are offended. In other words, to define justice from ground up, we need to define the values that justice is to protect.

Where, then, to seek these values? It is usual that within a certain group or society some values are shared, while others are in contradiction. The basis for justice might well be the values that all hold, but in many cases, the values of an individual cross the values of the majority. In the eyes of a communitarian, the individual should bend for the cause of common good; a liberal, on the other hand, would deem the individual’s values as worthy of notice as those of the majority.

Furthermore, two alternate levels of justice can be derived from this: an individual might have a very different view of "the just man" than the community as a whole, even based upon the same values. It is often said that one should "judge for oneself", meaning that everybody should be allowed to form their own opinion. And "opinion" is, indeed, the word that makes an individual view of justice seem subordinate to the common view, as any single opinion is, by definition, subjective. The concept of pure objectivity and whether it can be achieved in any practical circumstances can be debated over nigh indefinitely, but the fact remains that a group of people have a higher chance of getting even close to an objective judgment.

I will later on discuss the contradiction of common and individual good in more detail. For now, it can be concluded that as long as a person is required to live within a society of some kind, even the simple reality of objectivity and the lack thereof makes it reasonable to expect compliance with that society’s judgment. This is, after all, what belonging to any group – a family as well as a nation – usually implies. If compliance is unthinkable, the society, the individual, or the relation in between has to change.

Let us return to Plato and his suggestion of what is just. In the face of the contradictions specified above, who is the friend, who the enemy? Is one only responsible for "benefiting" or "harming" one’s own acquaintances? Hardly – friends and enemies alike can get killed in a car accident or go bankrupt due to certain financial decisions – so, on a larger scale: is a friend someone who shares a person’ s values and an enemy someone who does not? Or perhaps someone who shares the society’s values, or does not?

At first, this interpretation does not appear acceptable, either, since it is true in interpersonal as well as international affairs that friends can have different values and enemies can be in agreement to a surprising extent. However, what causes enmity, for instance, if not disagreement about values? True enough, human history is a sordid tale of seemingly pointless hostility, but the only point that such hostility might have, if any, would seem to be a contradiction of values too deep for compromise. Indeed, even the "pointlessness" contains most likely a certain reason, a value that drives people forward, no matter how unworthy it might seem to a non-contemporary.

Similarly, nations who can reach concord have enough in common to accept – or ignore – their differences.

The question is whether we should treat anybody as an enemy, it would seem. How much is "enough in common"? Should anything be, or should we allow anything to be, "too deep for compromise"? Who is "an enemy of the state", for that matter? All these questions relate to the nature of justice, in the sense that if we do accept justice as a form of protection, "to harm an enemy" would be acceptable only if viewed as a form of defense. Realization of justice, protection of values, can lead to violating other, different values. Even if this is required for the continuity of the values protected, can such action be defended in any other way than the belief in "absolute good"? Most theses that rely on an ethic absolute seem precarious, at best. Within a state, harming an enemy would mean a penalty of some kind, internationally it could lead to a war – is this to be described as protection, or punishment?

Even if we could define what is "good" and decide who is worthy of it, "doing good" might well be far from simple. Due to the various sets of values possessed by various people, the whole intention could turn upside-down – to mention an extreme example, euthanasia is sought by some, but deemed illegal by others. Those who are against euthanasia can, among other reasons, believe that they only benefit those who would want it, by preventing them from making a grievous mistake. Of course, there are also those who would comply with the wishes for euthanasia, but who fear that its legalization would bring about a wave of crimes protected by the veil of law.

Benefiting others is problematic if somebody apparently refuses to do what is good for him. If the death of a mortally ill patient, who seeks only an end to his pain, is delayed, is it positively "good" for the patient? We might think that life is valuable above all else, but then we have no experience of the situation the patient finds himself in. In doing good to our friends, should we do the things we value, or the things they do?

Many sage pieces of advice have been given on this, such as "treat others as you would like to be treated." However, "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" could also be applied in many a case. In everyday situations, most well- meant gestures can eventually do what they are meant to do, as long as explanation is added if required. It is when we find ourselves trying to show someone else "the correct code of conduct" or "the right way of doing something" that problems occur. A traditional carpenter might curse the modern technology someone would like to present to him, because not only are the appliances useless in his point of view, but the offer itself offends his handicraft.

The dilemma gets even more complicated if a society’s benefit is taken into consideration. A dictator might believe that his actions are beneficial to his people even when he deprives them of the resources they have had before. On the other hand, a child might be raised to follow orders and obey society’s rules in every aspect of life because his parents think that is good for his character and his citizenship skills. Is society’s benefit interwoven with the benefit of each individual in it, and if so, who is to be the judge of that? A liberal mind would think that no one should be coerced to be one with the community, but if belonging to a community is regarded as a good life by many, why not promote such a way of life? It would be logical to assume that it is beneficial to the society if all individuals within its boundaries feel that they are leading a good and satisfying life. Not only does coercion violate a person’s individual nature, if we take that into consideration, but it may also be quite useless, as stated above: a person can hardly find anything good or satisfying in a life that he believes to be neither.

With all kinds of benefits and bows to a certain direction or another, there are always the consequences to remember – for instance, what kind of an example a certain kind of behavior will set. Every society must deem within itself what is promoted. Nevertheless, if you want to make somebody happy, you will either have to do what makes him happy, or convince him that what you do actually makes him happy. If we agree that moralizing is not a virtue, we will have to do as the Romans do for the result we hope to achieve. Treating others as we would like to be treated might, then, be replaced with benefiting others as they would like to be benefited.

When international relations are taken into account, the questions to be answered are often similar to the ones we have to solve in domestic affairs. Still, a cultural variety of countless different views and customs must be given some extra thought. Namely, of course, in this jungle of virtues and values, what and whom should we heed? Plato writes about "harming the enemy if he is bad." We can cause harm by our definition, or by others’ – but how to define whether or not someone is "bad"? Within one society, someone is most likely bad when he offends the way of life of that society – after all, neither a child nor a mercenary would ever behave in a "bad" manner if their definition of "bad" was recognized. Different cultural interpretations of "bad" and "evil" are to be equal in the face of justice, we are told, so what values to build this justice upon?

It is hardly for anyone outside of a culture to decide whether someone is bad in terms of that culture. However, when someone offends another person from another culture in a way that is considered bad or illegal only in the culture of the person offended, the cause may be simple ignorance or willful malice. Of course, if former is the case, the cure is fairly simple as well: education. A traveler in a foreign country must more often than not learn the local ways, if he wishes to build any particularly cordial relations with the people he meets. In the case of malice, maybe even exploitation of certain cultural differences, the principle would be basically the same: a traveler is a guest, and he must behave accordingly. We have concluded that benefit is only beneficial if the person benefited also believes so, and the same seems to apply to justice as well. Thus, if justice is to be rightfully available to all, all should have the right to receive justice according to the definition they believe in.

It is clear that this causes problems: women who have traveled in Islamic countries, for instance, have been gravely punished for their manner and clothing, in a way that many Westerners find quite unacceptable. However, some modification of both the requirements and the punishments could help. A person from a different culture and religion can maybe not be expected to follow all the rules, but at least show respect for them – this way both sides would have to show tolerance. And, since the offender’s right to be judged according to his culture should also be considered, it is reasonable that he receive the kind of penalty he could expect in his own culture. For instance, a penalty of shame could be far more traumatic for someone who has not even known of its existence.

These measures are certainly not enough to prevent conflicts, since new problems are noticed only as they arise, and the more complex the rules, the easier to exploit the possible – and, unfortunately, probable – gaps in them. Nevertheless, most cultures do have some things in common, one way or another: human life, for instance, is given reverence and the taking of it is not casual. The mutual aspects of cultures and their values are the basis for international, intercultural justice, and universally acceptable interpretations of Plato’s "good", "friend" and "benefit".